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Comment 
UNITED STATES V. JONES:  THE FOOLISH 
REVIVAL OF THE “TRESPASS DOCTRINE” IN 
ADDRESSING GPS TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment has generally been interpreted to protect 
individuals from warrantless government searches and seizures.1  The 
Supreme Court’s determination as to what constitutes a “search” has 
become increasingly complex in light of advances in surveillance 
technology.2  During the beeper age, the Court considered whether the 
government’s use of these electronic tracking devices constituted a 
search.3  However, with the decrease in beeper popularity due to its 
limited technology, the emergence and widespread use of advanced 
Global Positioning System (“GPS”) technology as a new government 
                                                 
†  Winner of the 2012 Valparaiso University Law Review Case Comment Competition. 
1 Ramya Shah, Recent Development, From Beepers to GPS:  Can the Fourth Amendment 
Keep up with Electronic Tracking Technology?, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281, 282 (2009) 
(footnotes omitted) (“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees 
the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the 
government. . . . The Fourth Amendment also has been interpreted to generally include a 
warrant requirement.”); see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (explaining that 
searches conducted without court-issued warrants are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment with few exceptions).  The Fourth Amendment provides in part, “The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2 See Patrick B. McGrath, Note, Tracking Knotts:  How GPS Technology Is Influencing 
Traditional Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 12 J. HIGH TECH. L. 231, 231–33 (2011) 
(discussing the government’s increased usage of electronic tracking devices to increase the 
efficiency of investigations and the Supreme Court’s struggle in interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment in light of modern surveillance technology). 
3 See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707–10 (1984) (considering whether the 
government’s installation and use of a beeper to gather information concerning a 
conspiracy to posses and distribute cocaine constituted a “search”); United States v. Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276, 277–80 (1983) (considering whether the government’s use of a beeper to gather 
information concerning a conspiracy to manufacture controlled substances constituted a 
search); see also McGrath, supra note 2, at 248 (recalling the popularity of beepers in the 
1970s and 1980s).  Once beepers are attached to an object, they work by emitting “beeping” 
sounds to indicate that item’s location.  Id.  Beeper capabilities are limited in surveillance, 
however, because of the device’s short battery life and limited signal, which requires 
officers to actively track the device’s location.  Id. 
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surveillance tool now presents the Court with a novel issue under Fourth 
Amendment analysis.4 
Since its decision in Katz v. United States, the Court has typically 
analyzed the government’s use of surveillance technology under the 
Fourth Amendment using the reasonable expectation of privacy test.5  In 
United States v. Jones, the Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
the government’s attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle and use of the 
device to monitor the vehicle’s movements constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search or seizure.6  In a surprising opinion,7 the Court 
strayed from recent precedent and analyzed Jones under a “trespass 
test,” holding simply that the government’s physical intrusion on the 
                                                 
4 See Shah, supra note 1, at 293.  Shah points out how the popularity of beepers used in 
the 1980s and 1990s has disappeared with the emergence of GPS technology.  Id. at 283.  
Shah notes that GPS technology allows law enforcement officers to conduct surveillance 
with more precision and efficiency because devices can collect data continually without 
necessitating active police tracking.  Id. at 289–90.  Shah argues that in light of the 
availability and advanced capabilities of such technology, courts should consider the use of 
GPS technology as a novel area of law under Fourth Amendment analysis.  Id. at 293–94.  
See also Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 414–21 (2007) (providing a brief overview of the 
advanced capabilities of GPS technology and its uses in law enforcement). 
5 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining the reasonable expectation test).  
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s actual, or subjective, expectation of 
privacy when society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.  Id.  When that individual’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy are violated, a Fourth Amendment search has occurred.  
Id. at 353 (“[I]t is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply 
‘areas’—against unreasonable search and seizures[; therefore,] it becomes clear that the 
reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion 
into any given enclosure.”); see, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001) 
(holding that the use of a thermal-imaging device to measure radiation emanating from 
inside petitioner’s home violated the petitioner’s reasonable expectation of privacy and 
constituted a search); Karo, 468 U.S. at 711–14, 719 (holding that the government’s 
placement of a beeper into a canister not belonging to the defendant did not violate any 
legitimate expectation of privacy; however, using the beeper to monitor the canister that 
was in a dwelling occupied by co-defendants did violate their legitimate expectation of 
privacy); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281, 285 (holding that the government’s use of a beeper to 
monitor the co-defendant’s car on public roads from one place to another did not violate 
any legitimate expectation of privacy). 
6 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948–49 (2012).  Although Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority, did not consider whether the government’s actions constituted a 
“seizure,” Justice Alito considered the issue and concluded the government’s actions did 
not constitute a seizure because the government had not interfered with Jones’s possessory 
rights in the vehicle.  Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). 
7 See McGrath, supra note 2, at 257–58.  McGrath predicted the Supreme Court would 
find the installation and use of the GPS to monitor a vehicle on public streets was not a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  According to McGrath, the use of electronic 
tracking devices for vehicle surveillance is constitutional under Knotts and Karo, because an 
individual does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy when driving on public roads.  
Id. at 258. 
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vehicle for surveillance purposes constituted a search under traditional 
Fourth Amendment interpretation.8 
This Comment first introduces the facts present in United States v. 
Jones.9  Second, this Comment examines the Court’s use of the reasonable 
expectation test and traditional notions of Fourth Amendment privacy in 
evaluating electronic surveillance technology under the amendment.10  
Finally, this Comment presents the Court’s holding in Jones, arguing the 
Court’s use of the “trespass doctrine” constituted a misapplication of 
precedent that ignored the novel and complex issues relating to GPS 
technology, thus, creating unintended consequences for future Fourth 
Amendment analysis.11 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE FACTS IN UNITED STATES V. JONES 
In 2004, Antoine Jones came under suspicion of narcotics trafficking 
and became the target of a government investigation.12  Using 
information gathered through various surveillance techniques, the 
government applied for a warrant authorizing the installation and use of 
an electronic tracking device on Jones’s vehicle.13  Although a warrant 
was issued, the police failed to comply with the warrant’s stipulations 
when installing the GPS tracking device.14  The government closely 
monitored the vehicle’s movements and location over a period of 
twenty-eight days through voluminous data received from the device.15 
                                                 
8 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.  But see supra note 5 and accompanying text (providing 
examples of the Court’s use of the reasonable expectation of privacy theory in recent cases 
involving electronic surveillance technology). 
9 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49. 
10 See infra Part III (explaining the traditional notions of Fourth Amendment privacy set 
forth in precedent). 
11 See infra Part IV (arguing that the Court misapplied the trespass doctrine in the 
context of GPS tracking devices). 
12 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.  The investigation was conducted by both the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department as a joint task 
force.  Id. 
13 Id.  Law enforcement agents obtained information through visual surveillance at 
Jones’s place of business and through use of a pen register and wiretap on Jones’s 
cellphone.  Id.  Although the vehicle was registered to Jones’s wife, Jones was the exclusive 
driver of the vehicle.  Id. at 949 n.2. 
14 See id. at 948.  The warrant authorized the government to install the tracking device 
within ten days and in the District of Columbia.  Id.  Government agents did not install the 
device until the eleventh day and attached the GPS to the undercarriage of the vehicle 
while it was parked in a public parking lot in Maryland.  Id. 
15 Id.  The data, collected by means of satellite signals, established the vehicle’s location 
within fifty to one hundred feet and relayed over 2,000 pages of information over the 
twenty-eight day period.  Id. 
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In 2007, the government obtained an indictment charging Jones with 
“conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute” cocaine 
and cocaine base.16  At trial, the government introduced evidence 
collected from the GPS device that connected Jones to the conspiracy.17  
The jury found Jones guilty and the district court sentenced him to life 
imprisonment.18  On appeal, Jones argued that the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence obtained through the government’s warrantless use 
of the GPS device, which continuously tracked his vehicle for a month.19  
The court of appeals reversed Jones’s conviction, holding that the trial 
court had based its decision on evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.20  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2011 to 
consider whether the installation and use of the GPS device constituted a 
search.21  The following section discusses Fourth Amendment precedent 
that is relevant to the Jones opinion. 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES V. JONES 
Traditionally, the Supreme Court used a property-based trespass 
theory when faced with challenges to government surveillance 
techniques under the Fourth Amendment.22  Under the trespass 
approach, a search occurred when there had been a physical intrusion on 
an individual’s “person,” “house,” “papers,” or “effects.”23  Although the 
Katz Court is credited with repealing the traditional trespass test,24 the 
                                                 
16 Id.  Although Jones was previously indicted in 2006 on multiple charges for the same 
conspiracy, the trial produced a hung jury on the conspiracy count.  Id. 
17 Id. at 948–49. 
18 Id. at 949. 
19 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom.  
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945. 
20 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 568.  The court, utilizing the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test, reasoned that the government had violated Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
by using the GPS device to monitor his movements for an entire month.  Id. at 563. 
21 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49. 
22 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).  In Olmstead, law 
enforcement agents placed wiretaps along telephone lines connected to the defendants’ 
homes and office.  Id. at 457.  When the defendants challenged the government’s use of the 
wiretaps as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court held that the government’s 
actions did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because officers had not trespassed 
on the defendants’ property when installing the wiretaps.  Id. at 455, 457.  See also Hutchins, 
supra note 4, at 423 (attributing the Court’s theory in Olmstead as the first method of dealing 
with enhanced surveillance technology under the Fourth Amendment). 
23 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464, 466. 
24 Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983) (“[I]n Katz . . . [,] the Court 
overruled Olmstead saying the Fourth Amendment’s reach ‘cannot turn upon the presence 
or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.’” (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2013], Art. 28
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Court questioned the theory in an even earlier opinion.25  In Silverman v. 
United States, the Court explained that the Fourth Amendment secures 
personal rights, not measurable by notions of property law, of which the 
most fundamental is the right to privacy from unreasonable government 
intrusion in the home.26 
Nonetheless, Katz marked a shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to 
government surveillance techniques under the Amendment when it 
introduced the reasonable expectation of privacy test.27  The Court’s 
subsequent opinions have adhered to the Katz reasonable expectation 
test when considering the use of surveillance technology.28  However, 
the Court has also continued to recognize the fundamental privacy-of-
the-home theory explained in Silverman when deciding these subsequent 
challenges under the Fourth Amendment.29  For example, in Kyllo v. 
United States, the Court considered the expectation of home privacy 
when it held that the use of surveillance technology to obtain 
information from inside the home constitutes a search if that information 
“could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion 
                                                                                                             
353)), with Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead . . . have 
been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated 
can no longer be regarded as controlling.”). 
25 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (“But [our] decision here does 
not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as a matter of local law.”). 
26 Id. at 511.  In Silverman, police officials used a “spike mike” to listen to the 
conversations taking place in the defendant’s house by inserting the mike under the 
baseboard until it made contact with the heating duct.  Id. at 506–07.  The Court held that 
the eavesdropping was accomplished by invading the defendant’s house and thus 
constituted a Fourth Amendment search.  Id. at 511–12.  The Court reasoned that the “core” 
of the Amendment was man’s right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion in 
the home, which was “a constitutionally protected area.”  Id. 
27 See Hutchins, supra note 4, at 425–27 (explaining that the Court in Katz departed from 
its earlier reliance on property rights and reformulated its theory to encompass 
government activity other than common law trespass); see also supra note 5 and 
accompanying text (providing the reasonable expectation of privacy standard derived from 
Katz). 
28 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing examples of the Court’s use of the 
reasonable expectation test in Kyllo, Karo, and Knotts).  In Katz, FBI agents attached an 
electronic listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth where the defendant 
placed phone calls.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.  The Court rejected the government’s contention 
that a search had not occurred because there had been no physical penetration of the 
telephone booth and reasoned that the Fourth Amendment may extend to that which a 
man seeks to keep private.  Id. at 351–53.  The Court ultimately held that the government’s 
surveillance activity constituted a search, because it “violated the privacy upon which [the 
defendant] justifiably relied.”  Id. at 353. 
29 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 178, 180 (1969) (interpreting the right 
adjudicated in Silverman as the “Fourth Amendment right to be secure in one’s own home” 
and explaining that the right had not been diminished by the Katz holding). 
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into a constitutionally protected area.’”30  The Court rested its decision 
on the proposition that an individual is presumed to have a reasonable 
and subjective expectation of privacy in his home.31 
Similarly, in United States v. Knotts, the Court considered the notion 
of privacy expectations in the home when deciding cases involving 
electronic tracking devices.32  In Knotts, the Court primarily considered 
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
travelling on public roads from one destination to another.33  However, 
the Court reasoned that an individual would have a “traditional 
expectation of privacy” in his home if a device were used to gather 
information in that area.34  Only one year later, the Court was presented 
with this issue in United States v. Karo and held that a violation of the 
inherently legitimate expectation of privacy in the home constituted a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.35 
In Knotts, however, the Court foresaw the potential issues associated 
with “twenty-four hour surveillance” but reserved such issues for future 
                                                 
30 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512).  In 
Kyllo, the government used thermal-imaging technology to measure radiation emanating 
from inside the defendant’s house.  Id. at 29.  The Court held the use of the device to obtain 
information constituted a search.  Id. at 34–35.  The Court reasoned that when applying the 
Katz test to alleged searches of the home, there is an established supposition that a 
subjective expectation of privacy exists and is also presumed to be reasonable.  Id. at 34. 
31 Id. 
32 See generally United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (considering whether using a 
beeper to monitor the defendant in a home violated a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
33 Id. at 281–82.  In Knotts, law enforcement officers planted a beeper in a container, 
which subsequently ended up in the co-defendant’s vehicle, and then used the beeper to 
track the vehicle’s movements from the co-defendant’s home to the defendant’s cabin.  Id. 
at 278.  The Court held the monitoring of the beeper was not a search.  Id. at 285.  The Court 
reasoned that the co-defendant voluntarily conveyed his movements to the public so that 
he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.  Id. at 281–82. 
34 Id. at 282, 285.  Absent an indication that officials had gathered information by 
monitoring the tracking device while the canister was inside the defendant’s cabin or in the 
surrounding area, the Court held that the surveillance did not violate any reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Id. at 285; see also, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179–81 
(1984) (distinguishing the curtilage of the home, which is considered part of the home and 
thus presumed protected under the Fourth Amendment, from “open fields” where society 
does not recognize an expectation of privacy as reasonable). 
35 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).  In Karo, law enforcement officials used 
a beeper, installed in a container of ether owned by the DEA and subsequently transferred 
to the defendant, to monitor the container’s movements and locate it in a house occupied 
by the co-defendants.  Id. at 708–10.  The Court first held that the installation of the beeper 
did not constitute a search because the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in a container belonging to the DEA.  Id. at 711.  Conversely, the Court held monitoring the 
beeper inside the house occupied by the codefendants constituted a search by recognizing 
that “private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of 
governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one 
that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.”  Id. at 714–15. 
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analysis.36  In recent years, lower courts have attempted to interpret the 
“Knotts exception” when analyzing government use of GPS technology 
under the Fourth Amendment.37  Prior to the Court’s decision in Jones, 
circuit courts disagreed as to whether warrantless government use of 
GPS tracking technology constituted a search.38  In 2011, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Jones to determine whether the attachment of 
a GPS tracking device to an individual’s vehicle and subsequent use of 
that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public roads 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.39 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. JONES 
A. The United States v. Jones Opinion 
In a 5-4 decision,40 the Supreme Court held that the government’s 
installation of a GPS tracking device on an individual’s vehicle and 
                                                 
36 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84 (“[I]f such drag-net-type law enforcement 
practices . . . should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether 
different constitutional principles may be applicable.”). 
37 See McGrath, supra note 2, at 250–56 (discussing the role GPS technology plays in 
federal circuit courts interpreting the “Knotts exception” to determine whether GPS 
surveillance constitutes a search); see, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  On Jones’s 
appeal, the court held that Knotts did not control, because the government’s use of a GPS 
device to track Jones’s movements for twenty-four hours each day over a twenty-eight day 
period fell within the “dragnet” type of surveillance reserved in that decision.  Id. at 555–
56, 558. 
38 Compare Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555–56 (holding that the government’s warrantless use 
of a GPS device attached to the defendant’s car to track the vehicle’s movements twenty-
four hours a day for four weeks amounted to a Fourth Amendment search), and United 
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533 
(2012) (holding the government’s warrantless use of a “mobile tracking device” attached to 
the defendant’s vehicle to monitor its location over a four month period did not amount to 
a Fourth Amendment search), with United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 995, 998 (7th Cir. 
2007) (holding the government’s warrantless use of a GPS device attached to the 
defendant’s vehicle to track its movement did not constitute “mass surveillance” and thus 
did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search).  See generally McGrath, supra note 2, at 
250–56 (providing an in-depth discussion of the circuit split regarding warrantless use of 
GPS devices in government investigations). 
39 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49.  While the Court presented the issue as whether the 
government’s actions constituted “a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment,” the majority opinion focused only on whether that activity had amounted to 
a “search.”  Id. at 948–54. 
40 The majority in Jones consisted of Justice Scalia, who delivered the opinion of the 
court, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayer.  Id. at 948.  
Justice Sotomayer also filed a concurring opinion.  Id. at 954.  Justice Alito filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgment in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined.  Id. at 
957. 
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subsequent use of the device to monitor the vehicle’s movements 
constituted a Fourth Amendment search under the “trespass test.”41  
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, began by providing text from the 
Fourth Amendment and proposed that a vehicle is undisputedly an 
“effect” as enumerated therein.42  Justice Scalia claimed the government 
physically occupied a constitutionally protected area when installing the 
device to obtain information and further maintained that such an 
intrusion would have been considered a search at the time the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted.43  In support of his argument, Justice Scalia 
construed the Fourth Amendment to reflect an intimate connection with 
property rights and used earlier Court opinions to illustrate his 
interpretation.44 
After a brief explanation of the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
set forth in Katz, the Court rejected the government’s argument that its 
installation and use of the GPS device did not constitute a search under 
such test.45  Justice Scalia urged that fundamental Fourth Amendment 
principles encompassed Jones’s rights against unreasonable searches so 
that the Katz test was irrelevant.46  Justice Scalia, citing to the Court’s 
Kyllo opinion for support, stated that the Court should preserve, at 
minimum, the degree of privacy afforded to individuals at the time the 
Amendment was adopted.47  Justice Scalia also utilized the Court’s 
opinion in Alderman v. United States to further argue that Katz did not do 
away with the Fourth Amendment’s concern for governmental trespass 
on the areas enumerated in the provision.48 
                                                 
41 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
42 Id.; see supra note 1 and accompanying text (providing the text of the Amendment 
quoted in the Court’s opinion). 
43 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949, 950 n.3. 
44 Id. at 949–50.  Specifically, Justice Scalia cited to Olmstead v. United States, where the 
Court held that the government’s use of wiretaps did not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
search because there was “no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”  Id. at 950 
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928)). 
45 Id. at 950.  The government argued that Jones did not have a socially recognizable 
expectation of privacy in the exterior of the vehicle, where the GPS device was attached, or 
in the vehicle’s movement on public roads, because both were visible to the public.  Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id.  In Kyllo, the Court held that the use of a thermal-imaging device to measure heat 
emanating from inside the defendant’s home constituted a search.  Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 29, 34 (2001).  The portion of the Kyllo opinion cited referred directly to the 
Court’s longstanding recognition of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home.  Id. at 
34. 
48 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51.  For support, Justice Scalia cited to Alderman for the 
proposition that Katz did not diminish Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the 
home.  Id. at 951.  In further supporting his proposition, Justice Scalia quoted the 
concurrence in Knotts, providing that “when the Government does engage in physical 
intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion 
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Further, Justice Scalia also distinguished both Knotts and Karo from 
Jones’s situation on the basis that the trespass test had not been 
applicable in those previous cases where the government did not intrude 
on defendants’ persons, homes, papers, or effects.49  In discussing the 
Knotts decision, Justice Scalia argued that the Katz reasonable expectation 
of privacy test utilized in Knotts was meant to supplement the trespass 
test, rather than replace it, when common-law trespass was not at issue 
in a Fourth Amendment case.50  Additionally, Justice Scalia also regarded 
the Court’s decision in Oliver v. United States as inapplicable to Jones, 
because it involved a governmental intrusion on an “open field” rather 
than a constitutionally protected area like that in Jones.51  Finally, Justice 
Scalia criticized Justice Alito’s insistence on exclusively applying the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test in Fourth Amendment analysis.52  
Such an exclusive approach, Justice Scalia argued, would create complex 
issues that are unnecessary to consider when the traditional trespass test 
applies.53 
                                                                                                             
may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983)).  That portion of the Knotts 
opinion referred directly to the Court’s holding in Silverman.  See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 286 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (referencing the Silverman opinion). 
49 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951–52.  Justice Scalia contended that Jones’s situation differed from 
the defendants in Knotts and Karo because he possessed the vehicle at the time the 
government attached the tracking device, while the defendants in Knotts and Karo did not 
possess the containers at the time of the beeper installation.  Id. 
50 Id. at 952.  In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor proposed a framework for 
determining when to apply either the trespass or the reasonable expectation test.  Id. at 955 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).  Under this framework, government surveillance techniques 
involving a physical trespass should be analyzed under the trespass test, while “novel” 
forms of surveillance not requiring a physical trespass should be analyzed under the Katz 
test.  Id. 
51 Id. at 953.  In Oliver, the Court clarified that “open fields,” as distinguished from the 
“curtilage” immediately surrounding the home, are not constitutionally protected under 
the Fourth Amendment because they do not entail a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173, 180 (1984).  In Jones, Justice Scalia distinguished 
the open field doctrine at issue in Oliver from constitutionally protected areas, such as the 
home or an effect, to demonstrate the significance of the government’s intrusion on Jones’s 
vehicle under the Fourth Amendment.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953. 
52 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54.  In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito 
applied the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard to Jones and concluded the 
government’s activity constituted a search.  Id. at 958, 964 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice 
Alito reasoned that long-term GPS surveillance used in a typical criminal investigation, 
such as the Jones case, differs from the short-term electronic tracking like that in Knotts and 
violates reasonable expectations of privacy.  Id. at 964. 
53 Id. at 953–54.  Justice Scalia specifically argued that the concurrence’s analysis under 
Katz would cause the Court to deviate from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to consider 
new factors.  Id. at 954.  But see id. at 961–62 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing issues found 
in the Court’s reasoning).  Justice Alito argued the majority’s reliance on the trespass test 
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B. Appraisal of the United States v. Jones Trespass Test 
In applying the “trespass test” to the facts presented in Jones, the 
Supreme Court alluded to the Olmstead v. United States doctrine.54  
However, the Court also borrowed the phrase “constitutionally 
protected area” from the Silverman Court in discussing Jones’s rights 
under the Fourth Amendment.55  Further, in supporting its application of 
the trespass test, the Court continually referenced the principle set forth 
in Silverman concerning an individual’s fundamental right to privacy in 
his home.56  Thus, although the Court revived the old trespass language 
in Olmstead, the Court’s use of precedent created an inference that the 
doctrine encompassed only the Fourth Amendment’s deference to 
sanctity of the home.  However, the Court attempted to fit Jones within 
the bounds of this protection by comparing the government’s physical 
intrusion on Jones’s effects to a governmental intrusion on a home rather 
than an “open field.”57  When the Court categorized Jones’s vehicle as an 
effect and compared it to the home, it implied that a vehicle should 
receive the same degree of protection from governmental intrusion as 
the home under the Fourth Amendment.58 
                                                                                                             
would present difficult problems in future cases involving electronic surveillance 
accomplished without a physical trespass.  Id. at 962. 
54 See supra notes 22, 24 and accompanying text (providing the holding in Olmstead 
under the trespass test and the holding in Katz overruling the application of that trespass 
doctrine in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
55 Compare Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 n.3 (“[T]he Government obtains information by 
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area . . . .”) (emphasis added), with 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (stating that the decision in Silverman 
was “based upon the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area”) 
(emphasis added). 
56 Justice Scalia utilized language from Alderman to establish that Katz had not eroded 
the strong protection afforded to the home under the Fourth Amendment.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
at 951.  Justice Scalia also cited a portion of Kyllo that referred to the Court’s longstanding 
recognition of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home.  Id. at 950.  Further, Justice 
Scalia cited the concurrence in Knotts, which used Silverman to illustrate that a physical 
intrusion on a “constitutionally protected area” may constitute a search.  Id. at 951.  See 
supra note 26 and accompanying text (providing a synopsis of the issue in Silverman); supra 
note 29 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s recognition that Silverman was 
concerned with the Fourth Amendment right to privacy in the home). 
57 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (distinguishing Jones’s situation from Oliver v. United States); 
supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s use of Oliver to establish 
that an open field does not receive the same constitutional protection as an individual’s 
home or effects like the vehicle in Jones). 
58 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (holding that a vehicle is undisputedly an effect under the 
Fourth Amendment without further analysis); see also id. at 949, 953 (referring to Jones’s 
vehicle as an effect enumerated in the Fourth Amendment, just as a home is also 
enumerated therein). 
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The theory that the Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s 
right to privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusion in his home 
has been reinforced throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.59  
However, the Court in Jones used the trespass test to expand the theory 
to include one’s vehicle without providing adequate support for its 
action.60 
C. Consequences of the United States v. Jones Opinion 
The Supreme Court’s misapplication of precedent in United States v. 
Jones has effected a revival of the repealed trespass doctrine.61  In a recent 
opinion from the Southern District of Florida, the court applied both the 
trespass and reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine whether 
the government’s installation of a GPS tracking device on an individual’s 
vehicle constituted a Fourth Amendment search.62  Despite the Supreme 
Court’s attempt to simplify Fourth Amendment analysis in cases 
                                                 
59 See generally supra Part III (discussing the Court’s tendency to consider privacy 
expectations in the home as reasonable in its decisions concerning the government’s use of 
surveillance under the Fourth Amendment). 
60 Compare Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was 
understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas 
(‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates.”) (emphasis added), and id. at 949 (“It 
is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is used in the [Fourth] 
Amendment.”), with Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“[I]n the case of the 
search of the interior of homes . . . there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common 
law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be 
reasonable.”), and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984) (“[P]rivate residences 
are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion 
not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to 
recognize as justifiable. . . . Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.”).  But see United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“‘One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle 
because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the 
repository of personal effects.’” (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) 
(plurality opinion))). 
61 See United States v. Hanna, No. 11–20678–CR., 2012 WL 279435, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 
2012) (recognizing the “re-emergence of a trespass theory for Fourth Amendment searches” 
in United States v. Jones); supra note 24 and accompanying text (providing the text in Katz 
overruling the trespass doctrine). 
62 Hanna, 2012 WL 279435, at *3–4.  In Hanna, the court held that the governmental 
intrusion did not constitute a search under the trespass theory, because neither defendant 
had a property interest in the vehicle.  Id. at *3.  The court further held that there was no 
search under the reasonable expectation of privacy test, because neither defendant had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle in which he did not have ownership or 
possessory interests.  Id. at *4. 
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involving a trespass, it seems courts will now have difficulty in 
determining which standard to apply.63 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the Knotts exception, legal commentators and 
professionals hoping for a clear resolution to the role of GPS technology 
under the Fourth Amendment will likely find themselves disappointed 
by the majority in United States v. Jones.64  While the Supreme Court 
recognized that the dragnet surveillance reserved in Knotts was at issue 
in Jones, the Court failed to consider the novelties of GPS technology 
altogether when reaching its decision.65  Rather, the Court attempted to 
simplify future Fourth Amendment analysis by foolishly reviving an 
outdated doctrine in an age consumed with ever-advancing 
technology.66  Ironically, the Court’s holding correctly reflected societal 
privacy expectations regarding GPS surveillance.  Contrary to the 
Court’s intent, the revived trespass doctrine will likely further 
complicate Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Brittany Boatman* 
                                                 
63 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (noting that potential “vexing problems” with GPS 
surveillance are irrelevant where a “classic trespassory search” is involved); see also supra 
note 50 and accompanying text (providing Justice Sotomayor’s proposed framework for 
determining when to apply the trespass test rather than the reasonable expectation test). 
64 See McGrath, supra note 2, at 256–57 (predicting that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Jones would resolve the circuit court split regarding warrantless GPS technology and 
clearly interpret the “Knotts exception”). 
65 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 n.6 (recognizing that the kind of surveillance made possible 
by GPS devices fell within the “dragnet-type law enforcement practices” reserved in Knotts 
for later analysis). 
66 In Kyllo, Justice Scalia himself, writing for the majority, stated that “[i]t would be 
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment 
has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”  Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001). 
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